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HUNDRED YEARS SINCE YUGOSLAVIA'S BIRTH: LESSON ON
NATIONALISM, BALKANIZATION AND RELIGION IN EUROPE'S
PERIPHERY1

By Vjekoslav Perica

Vjekoslav Perica is a Croatian-American historian based in Baltimore, Maryland. Since 2006
Perica has held Professorship in History at the University of Rijeka, Croatia. He is the author of
scholarly books and articles, including Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav
States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; a revised 2-volume edition in Serbian,
Belgrade, Biblioteka XX vek, 2006) and Heavenly Yugoslavia. Interactions between Political
Culture and Political Mythologies, coauthored with Mitja Velikonja (Belgrade: xx vek).
Translations of Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States are upcoming this
year in South Korea and Poland. His article-chapter “Jerusalem Balkanized: The Kosovo
Controversy and Balkan-Mideast Parallels, 1985-2018,” will be published in Nadim Rouhana
and Nadera Shaloub-Kavorkian, eds., When Politics are Sacralized: International Comparative
Perspectives on Religious Claims and Nationalism, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2019).
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This lengthy foreword serves as a chapter that completes the concluding picture from the original version of
Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). Thus the
Korean translation of Balkan Idols is not just going to be a linguistic interpretation but supplement to an ongoing
research on the new public, globalizing religions and the de-secularized nationalisms in our time. Although Balkan
Idols has been hitherto translated in several languages, what further makes the Korean edition special is the global
comparative perspective under which the story from the distant Balkans will be read and reconsidered. While it
seems too bold to compare historical experiences of the peoples in the Balkan and Korean peninsulas, there is at
least the widely known common experience of imperialism, tragic fratricidal wars, partitions and invented enmities
among kin peoples living side by side for centuries. Regarding the role of religion in recent history, during my
Balkan research trips, I have met devout Korean Catholics visiting what is now globally popular pilgrimage
destination of Medjugorje in Herzegovina. While their religious experience does not require profound knowledge
and critical thinking about the interaction of religion and nationalism in the Balkans, Korean researchers will benefit
from the critical approach to these topics. It is fortunate that Balkan religions have sparked the interest of Korean
academics. I am therefore deeply grateful to Dr. Chung Keunjae from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul,
Korea, for the translation of Balkan Idols to the Korean language. Thanks to Dr. Chung’s translation of Balkan
Idols, I am now hoping that both regions’ knowledge and culture will benefit from this book as a contribution to
these recent Balkan-Korea global encounters and exchanges of knowledge. I am also grateful to Dr. Snježana Zorić
at Hankuk University’s Global Campus for facilitating the communication between Croatia and Korea and making
this text better with comments as suggestions for which I also would like to thank Dr. Mila Dragojević of Sewanee
University, USA.
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In 2018, historians were marking the one hundredth anniversary of the foundation of a
nation-state in southeastern Europe remembered as Yugoslavia–the country of Southern Slavs.
The multi-ethnic nation used to connect several European ethnic groups of the shared Slavonic
ancestry yet were divided by three major religions and mutually exclusive ethnic nationalist
ideologies. The Yugoslav national project lasted seven decades under various regime types in a
sensitive balance often disturbed by wars. In the 20th century alone, the territory of the former
Yugoslavia saw six major wars, three cycles of ethnic cleansing and genocide, and about fifteen
various states and regimes, half of which have by now collapsed and disappeared from the map.
In a wider historical perspective, this Europe’s periphery has left the lesson which world history
curricula ought not to overlook: how the Southern Slavs united, rose out of obscurity and then
ruined themselves. In addition to that lesson, another may be developing as the world order
seems to be changing. The world today is not the same as that which was formed at the end of
the Cold War. Since the state arrangements in the ex-Yugoslav space have always changed and
restructured in response to major changes in international order, it is likely that the Balkans will
go to war again, possibly, again, in the broader context of major regional or even world wars.
As a result of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, a larger unified Yugoslav nation-state has
been destroyed and replaced by seven smaller states. Each now claims a distinct nationhood and
separate language, homogenizes the population ethnically and religiously within state borders,
establishes a state religion, perpetuates mutually contesting interpretations of the common
history, and invents numerous border crossings within the relatively small, interdependent, and
naturally shared space. The dissolution cost 150,000 human lives, not counting twice as many
people who have been crippled and traumatized for life. An additional several million have been
forced out of their homes in the warring factions’ effort to break up multiethnic communities
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aiming to create homogenous ethno-sectarian states. Headquartered at The Hague in the
Netherlands, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held 10,800
trial days, heard 4,650 witnesses, consulted 2.5 million pages of transcripts and passed 161
indictments—most of which resulted in long prison sentences for war crimes, crimes of genocide
and ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
The causes of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the 20th century Balkans are not wild
outbursts of ethnic or religious hatred as Western mass media used to speculate. Rather, genocide
and ethnic cleansing are unavoidable maladies of ethnoreligious types of nationalism. Balkan
genocides and ethnic cleansing campaigns in the 20th century were pre-planned methods for the
restructuring diverse societies, which formed over many centuries into historically
unprecedented ethnically and religiously homogenous states. The reason Yugoslavia was
destroyed is not because it was communist and authoritarian in order to make it democratic. It
was destroyed because it was a multiethnic nation-state in order to balkanize it into ethnically
homogenous states most of which never sincerely wanted democracy. The Balkan ethnoreligious
nationalist revolutions of the 1990s have destroyed a unique civilization. They aimed to
annihilate the pluralistic social fabric consisting of culturally pluralistic communities,
multiethnic cities, and millions of ethnically and religiously mixed marriages. They also targeted
monuments, memorials, libraries, archeology, architecture, literature, history, and the memory of
the common state and similarities among its former peoples. Portrayed by the new nationalist
myths as the restoration of ethnic kingdoms originating in the Middle Ages, and therefore seen as
“natural” versus the allegedly “artificial” Yugoslavia, the new states were historically
unprecedented artificial constructs and hybrids of recent history. The novelty of the alleged “old
nations” is evident from their new national ideologies that have mainly been constructed by the
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historical revisionism of the Second World War, the Cold War, and the Balkan wars of the
1990s.
In the Balkans, legacies of imperial conquest left a heterogeneous population in a land
where Eastern and Western Christianity overlap boundaries with each other and Islam. Over
centuries there have emerged culturally diverse societies with the four common-language
speaking Slavic ethnic nations; their close ethnic relatives are Slovenes, and several dozen ethnic
minorities of which Albanians were the largest. In such a setting, no culturally homogenous
ethnoreligious nation-state would be possible without tribal wars, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.
Therefore, in the 19th century, positive ideologies of peaceful interethnic integration and
cooperation as the path to development, national emancipation, and successful nation-building
emerged. For nearly two hundred years these ideologies had been more influential than separatist
ethnic nationalism, which came to the forefront only in extraordinary circumstances—such as the
Nazi-fascist occupation in the Second World War when the invaders pitted the local groups
against each other, and following the end of the Cold War and collapse of communism. In the
end, the turmoil of post-communism and the genocidal wars of the 1990s enabled ethno-sectarian
nationalisms to defeat the idea of multiethnic integration, which is unlikely to ever re-emerge in
the form of a unified statehood.
Consequently, ethnic cleansing has been partly accomplished and war crimes paid off as
a long-term investment. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a homogenous Serb sub-state (called Republika
Srpska) has been created through ethnic cleansing and genocide. The Dayton Peace Accords of
1995 legitimized it, which has largely satisfied the Serb nationalists’ war aims. Bosnian
Muslims, once representing an indigenous European Islam bridging the East and West, began
importing foreign brands of radical Islam from Iran and Saudi Arabia. In Croatia, after the 1991-
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1995 war, Croat nationalism emerged triumphant defeating a Serb separatist movement and
forcing most of Croatia’s native Serbs out. Meanwhile, the new Croat nationalism has grown to
rival Serbian nationalism, and the two continued to hold the whole region hostage to their mutual
hostility. While their states force Serbs and Croats to differ from each other as much as possible,
the common language under different labels continues to work well for all, as well as the two
nation-states’ key similarities. These similarities include a church-state symbiosis and the type of
nationalist mythology that commemorates lost battles. Finally, in the Western Balkans’
southeastern pocket, the Kosovo province, Serbs have made several attempts to ethnically
cleanse the majority Albanians since the early 20th century. In the end, Kosovo Albanians have
succeeded to expel almost all Serbs from the land which once was the Serbian medieval empire.
Like most other post-Yugoslav states, the new state of Kosovo is largely a failure. The
neighboring miniature Balkan states of Montenegro and Macedonia are in no better shape (the
latter living 30 years without an official internationally recognized name and under threat of
partition into a Slavic and Albanian state).
In short, the Yugoslav fairy-tale from the golden age of the interethnic brotherhood and
unity, socialist workers’ self-management, charismatic Titoism and non-alignment turned into a
nightmare. Following Snow White’s death, the seven dwarfs lived unhappily ever after. Unable
to keep their house neat and mine diamonds, they even forgot to sing cheerful songs. They just
hated, envied, and feuded with each other. The very same nationalist ideology emphasizing the
cult of the nation-state, which gave birth to post-Yugoslav ethno-clerical regimes, crippled them
from the beginning. The seven smaller mutually feuding states, successors of Yugoslavia, have
been unable to maintain Yugoslavia’s independent status and carry on its reputation and
influence in international affairs earned during the Cold War. The post-Yugoslav dwarfs have
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become client states and semi-colonial domains of the great powers—Russia, Turkey, and
Germany—reviving imperial appetites in the Balkan region. The new Balkan states’ political
sovereignty was reduced to spheres of folklore and international sport. Economic sovereignty
was never established, meaning natural and economic resources have been quickly sold to
foreign banks and largely foreign private capital. Serbia and Croatia, the two principal Balkan
nationalist bullies, have national institutes for history and linguistics, national pilgrimage centers,
national cathedrals and national churches paid by the state but not a single large national
commercial bank. Furthermore, the cult of the state as the most sacred goal for which nationalist
movements mobilized people to war, became a costly burden on new societies and economies
threatening to bankrupt them. Taxpayers’ money fed the new corrupt elites and parasitic classes.
These include ethno-clerical nationalist parties allied with clerical elites, oversized military
forces and hundreds of thousands war veterans living on lavish pensions, and war veterans
organized in political lobbies to back right-wing nationalist politics and to plot authoritarian coup
d’ etats.
While economies struggled and political corruption spread; history, myth, religion, and
linguistics became priority topics in public discourse. Exhausting and absurd historical
controversies, denial of war crimes and genocide, glorifying criminals as heroes, obsessions with
“the negative other,” and the resentment caused by the unfair distribution of the socialist-era
wealth and property have engendered moral relativism, disillusionment, and cynicism. To make
the nationalist establishment even angrier, the former Yugoslavia seems to have continued life.
The nostalgic cultures of memory thrive in subcultural and virtual spheres, and in a postYugoslav diaspora, honoring Yugoslavia’s founding anti-fascist years in the Second World War,
and the golden age of socialist modernization and international non-alignment from the 1960s to
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1980s. In addition, the common language of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and Bosnians (without
an official name it’s called “ours” by all) and the Yugo-nostalgic culture and memory continue to
defy the invented segregation. Three decades later, the destroyed country seems revived as
culture and memory connect people within the common space simply called “the region.”
The post-Yugoslav nationalism is strikingly religious. As ethnic leaders show off the
official religiosity, new churches and mosques have mushroomed across the region. According to
the new national identities, all Serbs are presumed to be Christians of the Greek Orthodox
tradition, members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and unwavering believers in its mythical
interpretations of history. The neighboring Croats are practicing Roman Catholics and must
adhere to the Church’s interpretations of history, most importantly of the World War II, the
communist era, and of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Likewise, Islam for Bosnian Muslims is
both religion and nationality. Most importantly, the Bošniaks have to believe that the Ottoman
rule in the Balkans was a blessing of a superior civilization rather than a brutal imperial
conquest. Clerical elites are handsomely paid by the state. Religious instruction in public schools
becomes de facto mandatory. Religious authorities take special spiritual and ideological care of
the members of police and military forces—preparing them for holy wars and cleansing of alien
faiths and cultures. School classes in earlier best-integrated ethnically mixed communities of
Bosnia-Herzegovina have been segregated along ethnoreligious lines. Religious institutions
influence educational and cultural policies and state-run media. Nationalist mythmaking is a
substitute for objective historiography. The ethnoreligious hatred which poisoned multiethnic
Yugoslavia has never subsided. The clerical elites who used to incite hate before and during the
war never confessed to the crimes committed by members of their own group, and have not
initiated interfaith and interethnic reconciliation, even of a purely ritual character.
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Despite the post-Yugoslav regimes’ apotheosis of the new nations as triumphant and
successful, an exodus of biblical proportions followed the wars of the 1990s. Instead of cheering
the theatrical show of new nationhood without substance, millions of people chose to resettle in
the West. From a population of more than 23 million, according to the last all-Yugoslav census
of 1991, the number of permanent residents in the ex-YU space today is probably less than 20
million. This exodus coupled with devastating demographic trends promises to resolve the
Balkan conflict by natural causes. By the end of this century, the Serbs and the Croats—the two
largest ethnic nations and the principal founders and destroyers of the common state, will face a
near-extinction. Even if their ethnoreligious nationalists ever admitted to their responsibility for
this outcome, the process will remain irreversible.
Similar to Europe after the First World War, the European Union fears balkanization, i.e.,
the violent fragmentation of larger states into smaller mutually hostile and barely viable units.
Historically, the most successful European nationalisms have been those that integrated and
united smaller states, autonomous regions, and diverse regional cultures and peoples to
successfully create larger nation-states. Thus for example, if Germany had not united several
hundred small German states into the large German nation after the Peace of Westphalia, Europe
would have looked like Central America, the Middle East, or the Balkans today. England, the
Netherlands, France, and Italy—among others—have also become worldly and historically
important nation-states thanks to the merging and integrating of autonomous regions, and the
diverse regional cultures and peoples into large nation-states. Nationalism as an ideology of
modernity, and progress presupposes integration and unification of smaller states into larger
states. The larger and stronger states will then pursue further expansion, economic growth, and
international competition. In addition, the western European nation-formation involved a leading
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role of the most developed regions. In the Netherlands—Protestant Holland and the northern
provinces in Germany’s case—it was again the Protestant north, in Britain it was industrialized
England, and in Italy it was the northern regions, etc. Regarding the role of religion in this
original Western European nation formation, the large successful nations have emphasized
secularism, religious tolerance, and the principle of church and state separation. Some of them—
notably France, Germany, and Italy—even came into conflict with major religions and clerical
ambitions asserting supremacy of the state.
The nation-formation in the Balkans featured the opposite of the Western European
precedent. Integrations and modernizing drives struggled and failed. The most backward regions
played the leading roles, religion fused with ethnicity de-secularized national ideologies, and the
nation-states became sacralized as mythical irrational fantasies with no rational developmental
and modernization agendas. Accordingly, if the Western European nation-building experience is
called nationalism, and if the Yugoslav project tried to follow this model, then the anti-Yugoslav
ethnic separatism would not qualify as nationalism. Balkanization, and the specific Balkan type
of nationalism, are actually some kind of antinationalism. Tribalism or ethnic particularism,
sectarianism, provincialism, and the established concept of balkanization, all seem more
appropriate terms than nationalism. Balkanization is the opposite of nationalism; it denotes
disintegration and destruction driven by wild passions without a vison, and it results in barely
viable states and problematic constructs of nationhood.
Among these balkanizing nationalisms, the Serb-Orthodox, which is particularly
ethnocentric and sectarian, has been the strongest and most influential in the Balkans. As such it
has influenced and created in its own image the neighboring Croat-Catholic and Bosnian-Muslim
ethnoreligious ‘nationalisms,’ not to mention Montenegrin, Macedonian, and Kosovar.
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Ironically, the more they struggled to differ from each other, the more they looked the same,
emulating the most hated and envied Serbs.
As a result, when the recent balkanizing tendencies spread westward, the head of the
Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis, warned in a 2014 interview that Western countries
struggling with ethnic separatism such as Spain and the United Kingdom, must do all they can to
avert “the tragedy of balkanization.” The struggling states of the postwar Balkans proved the
pontiff right. A Bosnian columnist has recently passed the following message to separatists in
Spain: “Look at us, Catalonia! Are you sure that you want to be like us!?”
Seeking a wider socio-historic context in which the new Balkan ethnoreligious
nationalism could possibly fit—while rejecting the ancient (religious and ethnic) hatreds thesis—
could be the phenomenon described as the “de-secularization of the world” since the late 20th
century. The process is broad and complex, yet, for example, countries which after the Second
World War experimented with ambitious social modernization emphasizing socialism,
secularism, and integration across ethnic and religious barriers, (e.g. Tito’s Yugoslavia, Israel
prior to 1967, Nehru’s India, Indonesia, Egypt, etc.), have experienced the religious nationalistic
and anti-secularist backlash from the 1970s to the present. In the case of the former Yugoslavia,
the resurgent religions since the 1970s had concealed the real agenda of the interethnic and
sectarian feud behind the Cold War battle cry against “godless communism.” In reality, the
vengeful Yugoslav post-communist religions did not hate systemic Marxism as much as they
hated the Titoist national ideology of Brotherhood and Unity, advancing interethnic harmony,
ecumenical dialogue, and interfaith cooperation. Apparently, the ethno-clerical nationalists’
hatred of the idea of a peaceful multicultural and interfaith integration seems stronger than both
the mutual animosity and fear of atheism.
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In conclusion, there has been the noticeable influence of organized religion on recent
nationalism beyond mere identity politics. Distrusted by early western nationalism, religion has
proved a recyclable material. In our time, despite all the technological and scientific progress and
numerous other secularizing factors, worldwide there are a number of states, nations, and
regimes that can be described as theocratic, clericalist, religious-nationalistic, or strongly
influenced by religion. In the case of former Yugoslavia and its successor states, religions have
begun their resistance to modernity as guardians of ethnic identities and resisters to
secularization. They ended up as instigators and legitimizers of massive crimes, co-creators of
problematic forms of nationhood, and virtual co-rulers of failed or struggling states. Even some
religious scholars have to admit that the quality of spiritual and moral life of religious believers
under communism might have been better if religion had been less opulent, public, and political,
and if people overall had thought less dogmatically.
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